A malpractice action requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) the defendant caregiver owed a duty of
care to the plaintiff-patient, (2) the caregiver departed from that standard of care, and (3) that
departure from the standard of care actually caused the injury claimed by the plaintiff.
"Causation" 11; often the critical component in a malpractice action because the presence of a
duty is often obvious, except perhaps in "Good Samaritan" cases, but the statutorily-required
expert witnesses will argue about whether the caregiver departed from some standard of care.
Because defining "causation" is difficult, there are interesting distinctions in legal versus
medical, sociological, or philosophical concepts of cause-and-effect. Applying this difficult
concept of "causation" to the very complex world of labor and delivery (L&D) does indeed beg
the question, just how can causation be established? [For this brief essay, I will address the more
typical negligence action against a healthcare provider. For interesting aspects of causation when health care institutions are accused of negligence, including vicarious liability, the reader is referred to Furrow BR, et al. Health Law, 2nd Edition: Ch. 7, The Liability of Health Care
Institutions, West Group, St. Paul, 2000, pp 372-93. Please note this hornbook has been updated
very recently.]
In an alleged malpractice action, causation requires the caregiver to have actually caused the
plaintiffs claimed loss, termed "factual causation." This is the mechanism underlying the "butfor"
test: but-for the caregiver's action, or lack of action, the plaintiff would not have suffered
injury. However, the "but-for" test fails in the complex world of health care, hosting potentially
multiple defendants (e.g., ob/gyns, anesthesiology staff, nurses), multiple diagnoses, preexisting
diseases, and negligence or lack of compliance by the plaintiff herself. One way to deal with
these complexities regarding causation has been the development of the concept, "proximate
cause". [See: Furrow et aI., Liability of Health Care Providers, b. Basic Causation Tests, pp 302-
3, citing Stecker v. First Commercial Trust Company, 962 S.W.2d 792 (Ark 1998).]
Proximate cause doctrines allow the trier of fact flexibility in imposing duties on defendant
caregivers in complex situations. The court instructs the jury that the jury may find the defendant
liable "" .ifthe injury is the natural and probable consequence of the original negligent act or
omission and as such might reasonably have been foreseen as probable." [See: Furrow et aI.,
Liability of Health Care Providers, b. Basic Causation Tests, pp 302-3, citing Stecker v. First
Commercial Trust Company, 962 S.W.2d 792 (Ark 1998).] Often, the defendant "proximately
causing" the injury is that actor closest to, or most "proximate" to the alleged injury. But that is
not necessarily true in all situations - perhaps especially in L&D.
Proximate cause is difficult to apply when there are multiple defendants. What if each alleged act
of negligence, by itself, was not enough to cause the injury, i.e. there is a lack of independently
sufficient causation? Is the admitting ob/gyn liable for a nonreassuring fetal electronic
monitoring result if the labor nurse fails to alert the doctor as to the ominous new finding? The
ob/gyn will be accused of failing to timely deliver, but isn't the nurse, at least, co-negligent as well? And if so, to what degree, or even percentage attributable, of the total damages should the
nurse be responsible?
Intervening causes can also complicate proving up proximate cause. For example, a doctor is
accused oflack of timely delivery of a distressed baby. Yet the mother was known to be high
risk due to hypertensive disease, thyroid disease, and advanced maternal age. Also, she called her
ob/gyn's on-call partner complaining of decreased fetal movements, but failed to arrive at the
hospital until 12 hours after she was initially instructed to go to an emergency room. The on-call
ob/gyn called ahead, preparing for the worst; he even selected his favorite nurse working that day
to evaluate the patient on arrival. Within an hour of hitting the front door of the hospital, the
patient is welcomed; admitted; evaluated; labs are drawn; an intravenous line is started; she is
electronically monitored, which demonstrates non-reassuring fetal tracing; an urgent cesarean
section is called; anesthesia is consulted; and the baby is delivered by the on-call ob/gyn - with
some not-unforeseeable subsequent neonatal respiratory problems due to meconium passage.
The defendant-physician claimed during litigation that the patient's preexisting conditions were a
contributory cause, possibly an intervening cause of the fetus's challenges, and the patient
herself was more proximate in causing the alleged damages than the caregiver (i.e., "contributory
negligence"). [This suit was dropped upon explaining this logic after the original petition was
filed. ]
Proximate cause includes an aspect of "foreseeability." The first prong of foreseeability is
"subjective": did the caregiver actually know and foresee the potential harm from his or her
actions, or lack thereof? However, a defendant cannot evade responsibility for his or her act via a
form of willful blindness or ignorance. Because of this, the "objective" prong in testing for
foreseeability is whether the vast majority of similar caregivers, in the same or similar
circumstance, would be able to foresee the possible injury?
Whereas proximate cause instructions are given to juries in most states, alternative causation
instructions do exist. Some years ago, California used a "substantial factor" test: the jury was
asked whether the defendant's conduct was a "substantial factor" in bringing about harm, thus
allowing the jury to find against the defendant even if the defendant's conduct was only a
contributing factor, not necessarily the most direct, most important or sole factor, or the most
proximate factor. Concepts of causation are likely to continue to evolve within American
jurisprudence over time.
What are possible defenses in the typical L&D scenario where a caregiver, sayan ob/gyn, is
accused offailing to timely deliver a fetus that ends up having neurologic impairment sometime
over the next 18+ years? [Statutes of limitation for impaired newborns vary, often tied to the
statutorily defined age of majority, or adulthood. Of course, all statutes can be updated, concepts
of causation updated, and venues can differ.]
- The ob/gyn did not owe an actual duty (the patient was delivering with a midwife; the
ob/gyn was not 'on call'; or, a "Good Samaritan" situation occurs, when an ob/gyn is
called in to deliver a complete stranger because the attending caregiver cannot be found).
- The ob/gyn actually fulfilled his or her standard duty; the plaintiff is erroneously
asserting that she should have been provided exemplary or outstanding care.
The two defenses above deal with 'duty' and 'breach of duty.' Potential defenses regarding
causation include:
- Preexisting cause(s), e.g. medical condition(s) of the patient that put her at high risk for
an lllJUry;
- Multiple caregivers, i.e. , the ob/gyn's care was not the "most proximate" to the alleged
damages, as a nurse-midwife and anesthesiologist also acted when delivering the fetus ;
- Some other intervening cause actually resulted in the injury, not the ob/gyn's care, e.g.,
placental abruption caused by cocaine use, not the hypertension the doctor was
managmg;
- The injury was not foreseeable by the 'reasonable' ob/gyn, e.g., an unsuspected
chromosomal anomaly causing sudden intrauterine fetal death during labor;
- The patient assumed the risk by her choice, e.g., refusing transfusion or cesarean
delivery; or
- A lack of scientific plausibility that the ob/gyn's action actually caused the injury, i.e. the
claim of negligence was based on 'junk science,' or an expert opinion was given without
a scintilla of scientific proof.
A hospital's L&D service is part operating room, part waiting room, part trauma center, and part
emergency room. Tn L&D, one can experience unimaginable joy, and deafening grief - many
times in the same typical day. Caregivers need to be held accountable for their actions and lack
thereof, of course, but also need to be given the support and mechanisms to provide standards of
care - or even than standard care - to their patients and their babies. Accurate, transparent
documentation, ongoing meaningful caregiver education, and fair review and analysis of cases
will contribute to the greater good of women and their infants, their families, and society overall.